- (1) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of dimethyl methylphosphonate, phosphorous oxychloride, thiodiglycol, dimethylamine hydrochloride, dimethylamine, ethylene chlorohydrin (2-chloroethanol), and potassium fluoride is April 28. 1986.
- (2) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of dimethyl phosphite (dimethyl hydrogen phosphite), methyl phosphonyldichloride, 3-quinuclidinol, N,N-diisopropylamino-ethane-2-thiol, N,N-diisopropylaminoethyl-2-chloride, 3-hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine, trimethyl phosphite, phosphorous trichloride, and thionyl chloride is July 6, 1987.
- (3) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of items in ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353 and 1C354 is February 22, 1989.
- (4) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran of dimethyl methylphosphonate, phosphorus oxychloride, and thiodiglycol is February 22. 1989.
- (5) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of potassium hydrogen fluoride, ammonium hydrogen fluoride, sodium fluoride, sodium bifluoride, phosphorus pentasulfide, sodium cyanide, triethanolamine, diisopropylamine, sodium sulfide, and N,N-diethylethanolamine is December 12, 1989
- (6) The contract sanctity date for exports to all destinations (except Iran or Syria) of phosphorus trichloride, trimethyl phosphite, and thionyl chloride is December 12, 1989. For exports to Iran or Syria, paragraph (2) of this supplement applies.
- (7) The contract sanctity date for exports to all destinations (except Iran or Syria) of 2-chloroethanol and triethanolamine is January 15, 1991. For exports of 2-chloroethanol to Iran or Syria, paragraph (1) of this Supplement applies. For exports of triethanolamine to Iran or Syria, paragraph (5) of this Supplement applies.
- (8) The contract sanctity date for exports to all destinations (except Iran or Syria) of chemicals controlled by ECCN 1C350 is March 7, 1991, except for applications to export the following chemicals: 2-chloroethanol, dimethyl methylphosphonate, dimethyl phosphite (dimethyl hydrogen phosphite), phosphorus oxychloride, phosphorous trichloride, thiodiglycol, thionyl chloride triethanolamine, and trimethyl phosphite. (See also paragraphs (6) and (7) of this Supplement.) For exports to Iran or Syria, see paragraphs (1) through (6) of this Supplement.
- (9) The contract sanctity date for exports and reexports of the following commodities and technical data is March 7, 1991:
- (i) Equipment (for producing chemical weapon precursors and chemical warfare agents) described in ECCNs 2B350 and 2B351;
- (ii) Equipment and materials (for producing biological agents) described in ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353, 1C354, and 2B352; and

- (iii) Technology (for the development, production, and use of equipment described in ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353, 1C354, 2B350, 2B351, and 2B352) described in ECCNs 2E001, 2E002, and 2E301.
- (10) The contract sanctity date for license applications subject to \$742.2(b)(3) of this part is March 7, 1991.
- (11) The contract sanctity date for reexports of chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C350 is March 7, 1991, except that the contract sanctity date for reexports of these chemicals to Iran or Syria is December 12, 1989.
- (12) The contract sanctity date for reexports of human pathogens, zoonoses, toxins, animal pathogens, genetically modified microorganisms and plant pathogens controlled by ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353 and 1C354 is March 7, 1991.
- [61 FR 12786, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 62 FR 25459, May 9, 1997; 69 FR 42865, July 19, 2004; 71 FR 51718, Aug. 31, 2006]
- SUPPLEMENT NO. 2 TO PART 742—ANTI-TERRORISM CONTROLS: NORTH KOREA, SYRIA AND SUDAN CONTRACT SANCTITY DATES AND RELATED POLICIES

NOTE: Exports and reexports of items in performance of contracts entered into before the applicable contract sanctity date(s) will be eligible for review on a case-by-case basis or other applicable licensing policies that were in effect prior to the contract sanctity date. The contract sanctity dates set forth in this Supplement are for the guidance of exporters. Contract sanctity dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign policy controls on specific items and are the relevant dates for the purpose of licensing determinations involving such items. If you believe that a specific contract sanctity date is applicable to your transaction, you should include all relevant information with your license application. BIS will determine any applicable contract sanctity date at the time an application with relevant supporting documents is submitted.

- (a) Terrorist-supporting countries. The Secretary of State has designated Cuba, North Korea, Sudan and Syria as countries whose governments have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA).
- (b) Items controlled under EAA sections 6(j) and 6(a). Whenever the Secretary of State determines that an export or reexport to any of these countries could make a significant contribution to the military potential of such country, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance the ability of such country to support acts of international terrorism, the item is subject to mandatory

control under EAA section 6(j) and the Secretaries of Commerce and State are required to notify appropriate Committees of the Congress 30 days before a license for such an item may be issued.

- (1) On December 28, 1993, the Secretary of State determined that the export to Cuba, North Korea, Sudan, or Syria of items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this Supplement, if destined to military, police, intelligence or other sensitive endusers, are controlled under EAA section 6(j). Therefore, the 30-day advance Congressional notification requirement applies to the export or reexport of these items to sensitive end-users in any of these countries.
- (2) License applications for items controlled to designated terrorist-supporting countries under EAA section 6(a) will also be reviewed to determine whether the Congressional notification requirements of EAA section 6(j) apply.
- (3) Items controlled for anti-terrorism reasons under section 6(a) to North Korea, Sudan and Syria are:
- (i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) to non-sensitive end-users, and
- (ii) The following items to all end-users: for North Korea, items in paragraph (c)(6) through (c)(45) of this Supplement; for Sudan, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(14) and (c)(16) through (c)(44) of this Supplement; and for Syria, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(8), (c)(10) through (c)(14), (c)(16) through (c)(19), and (c)(22) through (c)(44) of this Supplement.
- (c) The license requirements and licensing policies for items controlled for anti-terrorism reasons to Syria, Sudan, and North Korea are generally described in §§742.9, 742.10, and 742.19 of this part, respectively. This Supplement provides guidance on licensing policies for North Korea, Syria, and Sudan and related contract sanctity dates that may be available for transactions benefiting from pre-existing contracts involving Syria, and Sudan.
- (1) All items subject to national security controls.
- ${\rm (i)\ [Reserved]}$
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis, unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available for items valued at \$7 million or more to military end-users or enduses. The contract sanctity date for all other items for all end-users: December 16, 1986.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42)

- of this Supplement. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.
- (2) All items subject to chemical and biological weapons proliferation controls. Applications for all end-users in North Korea, Syria, or Sudan of these items will generally be denied. See Supplement No. 1 to part 742 for contract sanctity dates for Syria. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993), or unless an earlier date for any item is listed in Supplement 1 to part 742.
- (3) All items subject to missile proliferation controls (MTCR). Applications for all endusers in North Korea, Syria, or Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity provisions for Syria are not available. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (4) All items subject to nuclear weapons proliferation controls (NRL).
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or end-uses to Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military endusers or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for export and reexport to non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available.
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea will generally be denied.
- (5) All military-related items, i.e., applications for export and reexport of items controlled by CCL entries ending with the number "18".
- (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies

- (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea will generally be denied
- (6) All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and components.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied.
- (A) There is no contract sanctity for helicopters exceeding 10,000 lbs. empty weight or fixed wing aircraft valued at \$3 million or more; except that passenger aircraft, regardless of value, have a contract sanctity date of December 16, 1986, if destined for a regularly scheduled airline with assurance against military use.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for helicopters with 10,000 lbs. empty weight or less: April 28, 1986.
- (C) Contract sanctity date for other aircraft and gas turbine engines therefor: December 16, 1986.
- (D) Contract sanctity date for helicopter or aircraft parts and components controlled by ECCN 9A991.d: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea will generally be denied.
 - (7) Heavy duty, on-highway tractors
 - (i) [Reserved].
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (8) Off-highway wheel tractors of carriage capacity $9t\ (10\ tons)$ or more.
- (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-

- case basis. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (9) Large diesel engines (greater than 400 horsepower) and parts to power tank transporters.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
- (iii) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (10) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.
- (ii) Syria. A license is required for all national security-controlled cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment to all end-users. Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of any such equipment will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of any such equipment will generally be denied.

Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce

- (11) Navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment.
- (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users or for sidered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for exports of navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
 - (12) Electronic test equipment.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users or for sidered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for electronic test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other electronic test equipment: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-

- users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear enduses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
 - (13) Mobile communications equipment.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for mobile communications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other mobile communications equipment: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies $(\varepsilon.g.,$ items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
 - (14) Acoustic underwater detection equipment.(i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. A license is required for acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991, to all end-users. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users or for mon-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-users to Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North

Korea of such equipment of these items will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military enduses in North Korea of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

- (15) Portable electric power generator.
- (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (16) Vessels and boats, including inflatable boats.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. A license is required for national security-controlled vessels and boats. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for vessels and boats that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-uses or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of these items will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (17) Marine and submarine engines (outboard/inboard, regardless of horsepower).
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. A license is required for all marine and submarine engines subject to national security controls to all end-users. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for marine and submarine engines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract

sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of these items will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
 - (18) Underwater photographic equipment.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for underwater photographic equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other underwater photographic equipment: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28 1993)
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.
 - (19) Submersible systems.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such systems will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for submersible systems that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other submersible systems: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such systems will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies(e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)

have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

- (iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.
 - (20) Scuba gear and related equipment.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers and end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
- (iii) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.
 - (21) Pressurized aircraft breathing equipment.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
- (iii) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.
- (22) Computer numerically controlled machine tools.
- (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for computer numerically controlled machine tools that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other computer numerically controlled machine tools: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(i) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.
 - (23) Vibration test equipment.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for

- non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for vibration test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991; see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other vibration test equipment: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (24) Digital computers with an APP of .00001 WT or above, assemblies, related equipment, equipment for development or production of magnetic and optical storage equipment, and materials for fabrication of head/disk assemblies.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity dates for items that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other items: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(i) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. (A) Computers with an APP exceeding 0.0004 WT: Applications for all end-users will generally be denied.
- (B) Computers with an APP equal to or less than 0.0004 WT: Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or

non-nuclear end-uses, will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

- (25) Telecommunications equipment.
- (i)-(ii) [Reserved]
- (iii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for exports of telecommunications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other telecommunications equipment: August 28, 1991.
- (iv) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (v) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (26) $\it Microprocessors$ —(i) Operating at a clock speed over 25 MHz.
- (A) [Reserved]
- (B) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (1) Contract sanctity date for microprocessors that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.
- (2) Contract sanctity date for all other microprocessors: August 28, 1991.
- (C) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users or for sidered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (ii) With a processing speed of 0.5 GFLOPS or above.

- (A) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally be denied.
 - (B) [Reserved]
- (27) Semiconductor manufacturing equipment. For Syria, Sudan, or North Korea, a license is required for all such equipment described in ECCNs 3B001 and 3B991.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of semiconductor manufacturing equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other microprocessors for all end-users: August 28, 1001
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for semiconductor manufacturing equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other semiconductor manufacturing equipment: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.
- (28) Software specially designed for the computer-aided design and manufacture of integrated circuits.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other such software: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for

non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (29) Packet switches. Equipment described in ECCN 5A991.c.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for packet switches that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other packet switches: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users or some sidered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (30) Specially designed software for air traffic control applications that uses any digital signal processing techniques for automatic target tracking or that has a facility for electronic tracking.
- (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other such software: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of

- such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (31) Gravity meters having static accuracy of less (better) than 100 microgal, or gravity meters of the quartz element (worden) type.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for gravity meters that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other such gravity meters: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28 1993)
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (32) Magnetometers with a sensitivity lower (better) than 1.0 nt rms per square root Hertz.
- (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users or for case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for such magnetometers that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other such magnetometers: August 28, 1991.

- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (33) Fluorocarbon compounds described in ECCN 1C006.d for cooling fluids for radar.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such compounds will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for such fluorocarbon compounds that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other such fluorocarbon compounds: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such compounds will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (34) High strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such fibers will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210 that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210: August 28, 1991
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such fibers will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (35) Machines described in ECCNs 2B003 and 2B993 for cutting gears up to 1.25 meters in diameter.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other machines: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
 - (36) Aircraft skin and spar milling machines.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce

- (A) Contract sanctity date for aircraft skin and spar milling machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other aircraft skin and spar milling machines: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.
- (37) Manual dimensional inspection machines described in ECCN 2B996.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for such manual dimensional inspection machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other such manual dimensional inspection machines: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users or for sidered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-users, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (38) Robots capable of employing feedback information in real time processing to generate or modify programs.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of

- these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for such robots that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other such robots: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users or for sidered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-users, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (39) Explosives detection equipment described in ECCN 2A983—(1) Explosives detection equipment described in ECCN 2A983, controlled prior to April 3, 2003 under ECCN 2A993.
 - (A) [Reserved]
- (B) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996
- (C) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996
- (D) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally be denied.
- (ii) Explosives detection equipment described in ECCN 2A983, not controlled prior to April 3, 2003 under ECCN 2A993.
- (A) [Reserved]
- (B) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.
- (C) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports by non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.
- (D) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.
- (40) "Software" described in ECCN 2D983 specially designed or modified for the "development", "production" or "use" of explosives detection equipment.
- (i) [Reserved]

- (ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.
- (iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports by non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.
- (41) "Technology" described in ECCN 2E983 specially designed or modified for the "development", "production" or "use" of explosives detection equipment.
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.
- (iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports by non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.
- (42) Production technology controlled under ECCN 1C355 on the CCL— .
- (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied.
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (43) Commercial Charges and devices controlled under ECCN 1C992 on the CCL.
- (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally be denied.
- (44) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate, under ECCN 1C997 on the CCL
 - (i) [Reserved]
- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: June 15, 2001.
- (iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied.

- (iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: June 15, 2001.
- (45) Specific processing equipment, materials and software controlled under ECCNs 0A999, 0B999, 0D999, 1A999, 1C999, 1D999, 2A999, 2B999, 3A999, and 6A999 on the CCL.
- (i) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
 - (ii) [Reserved]
- (46) Concealed object detection equipment described in ECCN 2A984.
- (i) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these commodities will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 19, 2010
- (ii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these commodities will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 19, 2010
- (iii) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these commodities will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 19, 2010.
- (47) "Software" described in ECCN 2D984 "required" for the "development", "production" or "use" of concealed object detection equipment controlled by 2A984.
- (i) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these software will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 19, 2010.
- (ii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these software will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 19, 2010.
- (iii) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these software will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 19, 2010.
- (48) "Technology" described in ECCN 2E984 "required" for the "development", "production" or "use" of concealed object detection equipment controlled by 2A984, or the "development" of "software" controlled by 2D984.
- (i) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 19, 2010.
- (ii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 19, 2010.

Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce

(iii) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 19, 2010.

[69 FR 23630, Apr. 29, 2004, as amended at 69 FR 46076, July 30, 2004; 70 FR 14391, Mar. 22, 2005; 71 FR 20885, Apr. 24, 2006; 71 FR 51718, Aug. 31, 2006; 72 FR 20223, Apr. 24, 2007; 72 FR 62532, Nov. 5, 2007; 74 FR 2357, Jan. 15, 2009; 75 FR 14340, Mar. 25, 2010]

SUPPLEMENT Nos. 3–4 to Part 742 [Reserved]

SUPPLEMENT NO. 5 TO PART 742— ENCRYPTION REGISTRATION

Certain classification requests and self-classification reports for encryption items must be supported by an encryption registration, *i.e.*, the information as described in this Supplement, submitted as a support documentation attachment to an application in accordance with the procedures described in \$\frac{8}{3}\$ (740.17(b), 740.17(d), 742.15(b), 748.1, 748.3 and Supplement No. 2 to part 748 of the EAR.

- (1) Point of Contact Information
- (a) Contact Person
- (b) Telephone Number
- (c) Fax Number
- (d) E-mail address (e) Mailing Address
- (2) Company Overview (approximately 100 words).
- (3) Identify which of the following categories apply to your company's technology/families of products:
 - (a) Wireless
 - (i) 3G cellular
- (ii) 4G cellular/WiMax/LTE
- (iii) Short-range wireless/WLAN
- (iv) Satellite
- (v) Radios
- (vi) Mobile communications, n.e.s.
- (b) Mobile applications
- (c) Computing platforms
- (d) Multimedia over IP
- (e) Trusted computing
- (f) Network infrastructure (g) Link layer encryption
- (h) Smartcards or other identity management
 - (i) Computer or network forensics
 - (j) Software
 - (i) Operating systems
- (ii) Applications
- (k) Toolkits/ASICs/components
- (1) Information security including secure storage
 - (m) Gaming
- (n) Cryptanalytic tools
- (o) "Open cryptographic interface" (or other support for user-supplied or non-standard cryptography)
 - (p) Other (identify any not listed above)
- (q) Not Applicable (Not a producer of encryption or information technology items)

- (4) Describe whether the products incorporate or use proprietary, unpublished or non-standard cryptographic functionality, including encryption algorithms or protocols that have not been adopted or approved by a duly recognized international standards body. (If unsure, please explain.)
- (5) Will your company be exporting "encryption source code"?
- (6) Do the products incorporate encryption components produced or furnished by non-U.S. sources or vendors? (If unsure, please explain.)
- (7) With respect to your company's encryption products, are any of them manufactured outside the United States? If yes, provide manufacturing locations. (Insert "not applicable", if you are not the principal producer of encryption products.)

[75 FR 36497, June 25, 2010]

SUPPLEMENT NO. 6 TO PART 742—TECHNICAL QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ENCRYPTION ITEMS

- (a) For all encryption items:
- (1) State the name(s) of each product being submitted for classification or other consideration (as a result of a request by BIS) and provide a brief non-technical description of the type of product (e.g., routers, disk drives, cell phones, and chips) being submitted, and provide brochures, data sheets, technical specifications or other information that describes the item(s).
- (2) Indicate whether there have been any prior classifications or registrations of the product(s), if they are applicable to the current submission. For products with minor changes in encryption functionality, you must include a cover sheet with complete reference to the previous review (Commodity Classification Automated Tracking System (CCATS) number, Encryption Registration Number (ERN), Export Control Classification Number (ECCN), authorization paragraph) along with a clear description of the changes.
- (3) Describe how encryption is used in the product and the categories of encrypted data (e.g., stored data, communications, management data, and internal data).
- (4) For 'mass market' encryption products, describe specifically to whom and how the product is being marketed and state how this method of marketing and other relevant information (e.g., cost of product and volume of sales) are described by the Cryptography Note (Note 3 to Category 5, Part 2).
- (5) Is any "encryption source code" being provided (shipped or bundled) as part of this offering? If yes, is this source code publicly available source code, unchanged from the code obtained from an open source Web site, or is it proprietary "encryption source code?"